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Several producers decide to form a partnership, to which they con-
tribute both capital and labor. We propose a group-strategyproof mecha-
nism under which no single agent is tempted to secede from the partner-
ship: the inverse marginal product proportions (or IMPP) mechanism.
The IMPP mechanism combines aspects of common ownership with
the requirement that private property rights be respected: when an agent
decides to stop exploiting her own capital, the latter is shared between the
remaining agents in proportion to the productivity of their own capital.
The IMPP is in fact the only ￿xed-path method (as introduced in Fried-
man, 2002) to satisfy autarkic individual rationality; its path is uniquely
determined by the capital contributions of the agents. Thus, our results
provide one of the ￿rst economic motivation for the asymmetry of ￿xed-
path methods.
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11 Introduction
Because partnerships are usually comprised of a small number of partners who
can communicate and coordinate their actions easily, it is important that joint
pro￿ts be shared by a mechanism with very strong incentives properties.
One common rule to sharing pro￿ts in law ￿rms, for instance, consists in
assigning each partner￿ s share according to her seniority in the ￿rm. While
seniority (or ￿lockstep￿ ) methods are not devoid of appeal1, they are vulnerable
to the criticism that senior partners￿ who have no prospects for advancement￿
have a tremendous incentive to free-ride on the e⁄ort of younger partners.
Popular alternatives to seniority-based methods are productivity-based: pro￿t
shares mirror each partner￿ s billings. While these so-called ￿eat-what-you-kill￿
methods provide unambiguous incentives once cases are assigned, how to assign
them is a non-trivial question. Gilson and Mnookin (1985, p. 370) express
the di¢ culty of designing satisfactory productivity-based methods due to the
fact that partners often negotiate their pro￿t share by threatening to leave the
partnership with their own client base (a maneuver called ￿grabbing￿ ):
Because the ability to leave with the ￿rm￿clients is critical
to the strength of a lawyer￿ s threat, [...] lawyers have an important
incentive to make sure that clients in fact remain theirs, and not the
￿rm￿ s [...].
We feel that this concern calls for a mechanism which combines aspects
of common ownership with the requirement that private property rights be
respected. We propose such a mechanism.
1.1 The case for strategyproofness
The question of incentive compatible pro￿t-sharing is certainly not new and
has already been addressed in the Bayesian framework (see, e.g., Groves 1973,
d￿ Aspremont and GØrard-Varet 1979, Holmstrom 1982, McAfee and McMillan
1991, Levin and Tadelis 2005). However, a drawback of the Bayesian approach
is that it requires some informational superstructure: the mechanism designer
must assume a prior distribution of characteristics (or types), a certain attitude
towards risk (typically, risk neutrality) and a particular formula for updating
beliefs (typically, using Bayes￿rule). And, even if these assumptions are justi￿ed,
1See Gilson and Mnookin (1985) for a defense of lockstep methods.
2the system manager must bear the cost of estimating the prior distribution of
types.
On the other hand, the incentives criterion we propose does not rely on such
heavy informational assumptions. Under strategyproofness, it is a dominant
strategy for each agent to reveal her true type regardless of the belief structure.
I.e., an individual agent does not need to have any information about what other
agents know (their beliefs) or want (their preferences) in order to act in her own
best interest. In that sense, strategyproofness is a more robust requirement
than Bayesian incentive compatibility. Under group-strategyproofness, agents
also behave truthfully regardless of their cooperative possibilities; we contend
that the latter is an appropriate requirement in the context of partnerships. We
refer the reader to Sprumont (1995) and Barber￿ (2001) for recent surveys on
strategyproofness.
1.2 The partnership problem
Several producers of a common private good decide to pool their private produc-
tion possibilities. In addition to technological (or capital) contributions, each
producer makes input (or labor) contributions to the cooperative. We assume
that input is transferable across technologies. Two classical questions are: how
to jointly utilize their private capital and how to share the proceeds of their
cooperation (see Israelsen 1980, Sen 1966, Weitzman 1974)?
In a stylized version of the problem, each agent makes her privately owned
machine (her capital) available to all the group-members and can supply labor
to any machine. Practical examples include farmers pooling their land in a co-
operative; here, land is capital and input can be labor or seeds to be planted.
Examples of such cooperatives can also be found in the ￿shing sector (Townsend,
1994) and in the plywood industry (Craig and Pencavel, 1995). A similar sit-
uation arises whenever a group of experts (e.g. lawyers, physicians, ￿nancial
advisors, car salesmen, etc.) who can rank their clients in decreasing order of
productivity decide to engage in a partnership; each agent￿ s client base then
amounts to a decreasing-returns technology. By pooling their clienteles, agents
can reallocate their time or resources (the input) across the total pool of clients.
We assume that individual technologies are known to the planner and exhibit
diminishing marginal returns. However, information about the leisure/consumption
trade-o⁄of the agents is private, potentially leaving room for misrepresentation.
The ￿rst requirement is that production possibilities and input contributions be
3pooled e¢ ciently. Under diminishing marginal returns, there is a unique e¢ -
cient way to reallocate a given amount of input across the various technologies.2
Thus, the autarkic use of the production possibilities, where agent i only sup-
plies input to her own technology, can be Pareto-improved. The aggregate pro-
duction function (of the individual technologies) summarizes these production
opportunities.
While production e¢ ciency is easily obtained, allocative e¢ ciency cannot be
achieved, precisely because the preferences of the agents are private information
(see Leroux, 2004). In particular, it follows that a standard market mechanism￿
which computes the competitive wage and the equilibrium amounts of labor and
consumption for each agent￿ is manipulable; it would be in some agents￿best
interest to arti￿cially restrict her labor-supply schedule in order to command a
higher wage.3
In what follows we insist on strategyproofness while relaxing full e¢ ciency in
favor of the milder requirement of voluntary participation, i.e., every participant
should be at least as well o⁄under the pooling method as she would be by using
her own capital by herself; we refer to this condition as autarkic individual
rationality (or AIR), a term introduced by Saijo (1991) in the public good
context.
Our main contribution is the design of a simple, group-strategyproof and au-
tarkically individually rational mechanism to manage a partnership: the inverse
marginal product proportions mechanism (or IMPP).4
1.3 The IMPP mechanism
For the sake of exposition, we describe the IMPP mechanism in the case of three
agents (farmers) pooling their private capital (land). In Figure 1 are depicted
the marginal product (MP) curves of each farmer￿ s own land (MP1, MP2, and
MP3). We assume for clarity that each agent￿ s utility is quasilinear in the
amount of pro￿t, yi, she receives: ui(xi;yi) = yi ￿ vi(xi), where vi(xi) is agent
i￿ s disutility of supplying xi units of labor expressed in monetary terms.5
2For instance, if machine 1 is always more productive than the others, productive e¢ ciency
requires that the (n ￿ 1) other agents work on machine 1 instead of their own.
3A larger-scale manipulation of the sort contributed to the collapse of the California energy
market in 2001. Manipulation was successful even when as many as two hundred electricity
providers were involved! See Oppel, 2003. We thank Simon Grant for this observation.
4The mechanism we propose is actually Nash-implementable with unique equilibrium. In
this model the corresponding direct revelation mechanism is then group-strategyproof; see
Section 2 for a discussion of other, weaker interpretations of incentive compatibility.
5Our results hold on more general preference domains.
4IMPP works as follows. Consider a dynamic production process where labor
is allocated to land so that marginal product is equalized across ￿elds at all
times (but decreases over time). In the ￿rst stage, each agent works on her own
land and reaps the fruit of her labor, like in autarky, until one agent decides to
stop working. That agent then "leaves" the procedure with the output she has
secured thus far but her unused capital is now available for agents 2 and 3 to
utilize in addition to their own. In our example, agent 1 leaves the procedure
after supplying x1 units of labor: the intersection of her marginal disutility of
e⁄ort (v0
1) with the marginal product of her own land (MP1) occurs "￿rst", i.e.
for a higher marginal product level than the other agents (￿1 > ￿2, ￿3).
With agent 1 gone, her left-over capital is divided between agents 2 and 3 in
proportion to the inverse marginal product of lands 2 and 3, respectively. For
any marginal product level, ￿ < ￿1, compare the amounts of labor which can be
assigned to ￿elds 2 and 3 before reaching the marginal product ￿. Suppose, as in
Figure 2, that twice as much labor can be supplied to ￿eld 2 as can be supplied
to ￿eld 3: 2￿ and ￿, respectively. In a sense, ￿eld 2 is twice as productive as
￿eld 3. Accordingly, agent 2 will be allowed to supply twice as much labor as
agent 3 to ￿eld 1 at the margin￿ 2
3￿ and 1
3￿, respectively￿ and receive the
corresponding marginal increment of output.
The procedure is carried out until another agent decides to stop working (in
our example, agent 2 departs after having supplied x2 units of labor, see Figure
3) and the remaining agent (agent 3) can then freely operate all three ￿elds at
will.
Clearly IMPP satis￿es AIR: agent 1 is indi⁄erent between autarky and taking
part in the partnership while agents 2 and 3 e⁄ectively see their production
possibilities enhanced by the "departure" of agent 1. In addition, the mechanism
is strategy-proof: just like in an ascending-price auction, it is a strictly dominant
strategy for each agent to "drop out" when the (common) marginal product
equals her (private) marginal disutility of e⁄ort.
1.4 IMPP and the commons problem
Upon noticing that the production possibilities of the partnership are summa-
rized by the aggregate production function, as stated above, it becomes clear
that the IMPP mechanism can be applied to situations where a group of users
jointly operate a single facility exhibiting diminishing marginal returns: the
familiar commons problem.
5If agents have equal rights to the facility, by assigning to each of them virtual
property rights to "1=nth of the facility" and by applying IMPP one obtains the
output-sharing version of the well-known serial mechanism discussed in Moulin
and Shenker (1992). Thus, much better incentives are achieved than under, say,
average- or marginal-product pricing6.
Similarly, if agents do not have equal access to the common facility for ex-
ogenous reasons (e.g. social status), these di⁄erences can be taken into account
by assigning unequal virtual production functions before applying IMPP. The
corresponding sharing rule allocates marginal increments of input, and their
corresponding increments of output, along a path in the input space of the
agents. The slope of this path describes each individual￿ s relative access to the
facility. After an agent￿ s supply of input is met, the procedure carries on along
the projection of the path onto the space of the remaining "active" agents. In
other words, the active agents split the increments of input which would have
been assigned to inactive agents (i.e. their "rights to using the facility") in
the relative proportions granted by the original path. We call such procedures
￿xed-path methods (FPMs):
1.5 Organization of the article
After a brief review of some related literature, the remainder of the paper is
organized in reverse order relative to the introduction. We ￿rst de￿ne ￿xed-
path methods in a single technology model (Section 3) and recall their strong
incentives properties. We then show the close relationship between FPMs and
the IMPP mechanism (Section 4). Finally, we discuss the appeal of the IMPP
mechanism as a reasonable compromise between simplicity and responsiveness
to capital contributions (Section 5). Most proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Relation to the literature
This work contributes to the large literature exploring the trade-o⁄between e¢ -
ciency and incentive compatibility in the production and distribution of private
goods.
Our main result (Theorem 2) can be viewed as a follow-up on work by Fried-
man (2002, 2004). The FPMs described above are the output-sharing version
6We refer the reader to Moulin and Shenker (1992) for a discussion of the serial cost-sharing
rule in comparison to average- and marginal-cost pricing.
6of the mechanisms introduced in Friedman (2002) as non-anonymous general-
izations of the Moulin and Shenker serial cost-sharing mechanism. Theorem 2
establishes that to each partnership problem (i.e. any pro￿le of capital contri-
butions) corresponds a unique FPM sharing the aggregate production function
while satisfying AIR. Conversely, we show (Theorem 3) that to each FPM corre-
sponds a unique (virtual) decomposition of the common facility into individual
capital contributions; the FPM is in fact the IMPP mechanism applied to this
very decomposition. We thus establish a bijection between the class of FPM
to manage a commonly owned facility and possible distributions of property
rights to the facility. This result provides an economic justi￿cations for the
non-anonymity of FPMs.
Many rules outside of the class of FPMs meet our high standards of incentive
compatibility; their more complex path structure is similar to the ￿path func-
tions￿of Sprumont (1998) (see Section 3). This contrasts with Moulin (1999)
where it is shown in the discrete framework that FPMs￿ and the correspond-
ing IMPP mechanisms￿ are in fact characterized by an incentive compatibility
requirement fairly close to ours (see Remark 1). This discrepancy illustrates a
subtle di⁄erence between the discrete and continuous versions of the model and
is worthy of future research.
Recent related literature on the common production of private goods con-
siders weaker interpretations of incentive compatibility (see, e.g., Corch￿n and
Puy 2002, Shin and Suh 1997). For instance, Corch￿n and Puy establish that
any continuous sharing rule admits a Pareto-e¢ cient allocation which can be
Nash-implemented. Yet, any game implementing such an outcome must have
several, non-welfare-equivalent Nash equilibria at some pro￿les. Here we insist
on the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, a much more demanding requirement
than the above kind of Nash-implementability.
3 The single technology model
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of agents. Let F : R+ ! R+ be a production
function which is increasing, strictly concave such that F(0) = 0. We denote
by F the class of such functions. Each agent i provides a non-negative amount
xi of input to the common technology, and receive a non-negative quantity
yi of output such that
P
i yi = F (
P
i xi). We write x = (x1;:::;xn) and for
any i 2 N, (x0
i;x￿i) is the vector of inputs where the ith entry of x has been
7replaced by x0
i 2 R+. A bundle is an element zi = (xi;yi) 2 R+ ￿ R; we
de￿ne an allocation, z, to be a list of n bundles, one for each agent. We denote
by ZF =
n
z 2 (R+ ￿ R)
N j
P




the set of feasible allocations
under F.
Each agent i can supply up to Mi units of input (with Mi possibly very
large). Her preferences over bundles are de￿ned on R+￿R; they are continuous,
convex, strictly increasing in yi, strictly decreasing in xi and representable by a
utility function ui. While all our results are purely ordinal, we will use utility
representations rather than the more cumbersome binary relation notation. We
adopt the convention ui(xi;yi) = ￿1 if xi > Mi. We denote by U the class
of preferences. A preference pro￿le (or utility pro￿le) is a list of n preferences,
u = (u1;:::;un) 2 UN, one per agent. For any j 2 N, we will sometimes abuse
notations and write u = (uj;u￿j).
De￿nition 1 An F-sharing method (or F-sharing rule) is a mapping
￿ : RN
+ ! RN
x 7! (￿1(x);:::;￿2(x)) s.t.
P




which satis￿es the following monotonicity property:
@￿i
@xi > 0 for all i 2 N.
We denote by SF the class of F-sharing rules.
Monotonicity is a normatively appealing requirement. It states that an agent
should receive strictly more output as her input contribution increases: it gives
agents an incentive to supply input. Also, from the point of view of fairness, it
implies that every agent will receive a positive fraction of the output resulting
from her input contribution.
For any preference pro￿le u 2 UN and any F-sharing method ￿ 2 SF, we
denote by G(￿;u) the game in which each agent￿ s strategy space is R+ and agent
i￿ s payo⁄ is ui(xi;￿i(x)) when xj is the strategy played by each agent j 2 N.
We now de￿ne what we mean by "sharing a technology along a path". A
path is a mapping
￿ : R+ ! RN
+
t 7! (￿1(t);:::;￿n(t))
such that for all i 2 N the following two properties hold:
(a) ￿i is non-decreasing and di⁄erentiable almost everywhere on R+ with re-
spect to the Lebesgue measure,
8(b)
P






and ￿i(t) = Mi for any t ￿
P
j Mj.
We denote by P the class of paths.
Fix ￿ 2 P. For any i 2 N, de￿ne the mapping ￿i as follows:
￿i : [0;Mi] ! R+
xi 7! minftj￿i(t) ￿ xig.
(1)
Note that if ￿i is increasing, its inverse exists and ￿i ￿ ￿
￿1
i .
Given a path ￿ 2 P, we de￿ne the ￿xed-path method generated by ￿, de-
noted ￿
￿, as follows. Let x 2 ￿i[0;Mi], without loss we relabel the agents
such that ￿1(x1) ￿ ￿2(x2) ￿ ::: ￿ ￿n(xn); i.e. such that the coordinates of x
are met along ￿ in the natural order. Let t ￿ 0 be such that ￿(t) ￿ x, i.e.
such that no agent￿ s supply level has yet been met. ￿
￿ recommends that the













i(t) = 1). Once the input supply
of the ￿rst agent is met along the path (￿i(t) ￿ xi), we freeze her output share
and continue the sharing procedure with the remaining ￿active￿agents. The






until agent 2￿ s supply is met. And so on. We next give
a formal de￿nition.
De￿nition 2 The ￿xed-path method generated by ￿, denoted ￿
￿, is the F-
































for any x 2 ￿i[0;Mi].






F0 (j￿(t) ^ xj)d(￿i(t) ^ xi)
where j ￿ j returns the sum of the coordinates of a vector and ^ is the compo-
nentwise minimum of two vectors.






@xi > 0 for all i); hence, ￿
￿ 2 SF. Moreover, one can check (or see Friedman
2002, Lemma 1) that ￿
￿
i is strictly concave in xi.
We next give two examples of ￿xed-path methods:
Example 1: Incremental sharing. (n = 2) This method gives agent 1 full ac-
cess to F; once she is served, agent 2 can use F(x1+￿) at will. The corresponding
path is
￿
I : t 7!
(
(t;0) if t ￿ M1 < +1
(M1;t ￿ M1) if M1 ￿ t ￿ M1 + M2
i.e., ￿










2 (x) = F(x1 + x2) ￿ F(x1)
Example 2: Weighted serial rule. Assume M1 = M2 = +17. Let ￿1;:::;￿n >
0 and consider the path ￿
S : t 7! (￿1t;:::;￿nt). Let x 2 RN
+ and assume without
loss that x1
￿1 ￿ x2
￿2 ￿ ::: ￿ xn










￿k￿k+1F(xk) for all i = 1;:::;n,
where ￿k =
Pn
j=k ￿j, and xk = x1 + ::: + xk￿1 + ￿
k
￿kxk. As a particular case,
the usual serial rule assigns identical weight to each agent.
The family of ￿xed-path methods (FPMs) was introduced in Friedman (2002)
as a non-anonymous generalization of the serial rule retaining its strong incen-
tives properties.
Theorem 1 Let ￿ be an FPM, the following statements are true:
i) G(￿;u) has a unique Nash equilibrium,
ii) every Nash equilibrium of G(￿;u) is strong.
Proof. It is shown in Friedman (2002) that for any production function F 2 F,
any path ￿ 2 P and any preference pro￿le u 2 UN, the game induced by ￿
￿
satis￿es a more demanding equilibrium property called O-solvability.
7Although M1 and M2 were de￿ned as real numbers, the de￿nition of the weighted serial
rule readily extends to the case where they are in￿nite.
10It follows from a standard result of the implementation literature (see The-
orem 7.2.3 in Dasgupta et al. 1979) that the associated direct revelation mech-
anism is group-strategyproof.
While Moulin and Shenker (1992) established that the serial rule could be
characterized by the equilibrium properties of Theorem 1 along with Anonymity
(xi = xj =) ￿i(x) = ￿j(x)), these properties do not characterize the class of
FPMs when we relax Anonymity.
For instance, assume n = 3, F 2 F and let ￿ 2 P. Consider an F-sharing
rule ￿ that coincides with ￿
￿ until one of the agents is served, say agent i, but
then shares the remainder of F between the remaining two agents along a strictly
increasing subpath,  (i;xi), depending on the identity of the ￿rst-served agent






for some pair (i;xi). It is clear that agent i has
the same unique dominant strategy under ￿ and under ￿
￿. A straightforward
application of Theorem 1 yields that the remaining agents also have a unique
dominant strategy regardless of  . Yet, ￿ is not a ￿xed-path method. These
path structures are called path functions in Sprumont (1998), though his use of
path functions is ultimately quite di⁄erent from ours.8 Characterizing the class
of strategy-proof mechanisms is still a very large open question and is beyond
the scope of this paper. We refer the reader to a companion paper (Leroux,
2005) for a two-agent characterization result.
Remark 1 In the discrete version of our model, Moulin (1999) establishes that
"incremental sharing rules" (the discrete equivalent of ￿xed-path methods) are
characterized by similar strategic properties for any number of agents. Inter-
estingly, the continuous framework allows for a much richer class of incentive
compatible rules.
We show on a straighforward example why some of these more complex
rules do not meet our incentive compatibility requirement in the discrete setting.
Consider a technology given by the discrete increments @F : 4;2;1;0 (i.e. F(1) =
4, F(2) = 4 + 2,...) to be shared between 3 agents, each of whom can supply
0 or 1 unit of input. Suppose that the path structure used to share F yields
the following priority orderings: 1! 2 ! 3 if x1 = 1 and 1! 3 ! 2 if x1 = 0.
If preferences are such that agent 1 is indi⁄erent between bundles (1,4) and
8Note that when n = 2, the type of methods just described cannot be distinguished from
￿xed-path methods.
11(0,0), and if agent 2 prefers (1,2) to (0,0), then agent 1 can help out agent 3 by
deciding not to work, thus giving her access to the bundle (1,2) instead of (1,1).
The above rule is immune to coalitional deviations in a weak sense: at least
one agent in the deviating coalition does not strictly bene￿t (agent 1). Yet, not
every Nash equilibrium of the supply game is strong due to agent 1￿ s indi⁄erence
between two bundles. Such indi⁄erences are ruled out by the speci￿cations of
the continuous model.
4 Pooling private technologies
Consider now a situation where each agent privately owns a technology, fi 2
F, which she decides to contribute to a partnership along with an input level
xi 2 [0;Mi]. One can think of the individual technologies as being machines
(or capital) and of input as being labor time. Labor is transferable, meaning
that agents are able to work on machines other than their own. The manager
of the partnership (the planner) allocates the labor time of the workers across
the various machines; e.g., if x1 = 3, agent 1 may be asked to spend, say, two
units of input on machine 1 and one unit on machine 4. The resulting total
output is distributed between the agents according to their labor (the xi￿ s) and
capital (the fi￿ s) contributions. Technologies are known to the planner, but the
preferences of the agents are private information.
De￿ne F￿ to be the aggregated production function resulting from the e¢ -
cient usage of the combined individual technologies:
8t 2 R+ F￿(t) = max
(x1;:::;xn) 2 RN
+ P




Notice that because the fi￿ s belong to F, F￿ must also belong to F. We call
f = (f1;:::;fn) 2 FN the technology pro￿le (or capital pro￿le).
Thus, the pooling framework is tantamount to the previous context of shar-
ing a single technology. Here, however, autarkic individual rationality is a con-
cern: no agent should be better o⁄ by using her private technology on her own.
This voluntary participation requirement will end up determining uniquely the
￿xed-path method to use.
De￿nition 3 (AIR) An f-pooling method is an F￿-sharing rule ￿ such that
12for any preference pro￿le u and any Nash equilibrium x￿ of G(￿;u) the following
holds:
ui (x￿
i;￿i(x￿)) ￿ sai(ui) ￿ maxfui(xi;yi)jyi ￿ fi(xi)g 8i 2 N. (4)
We say ￿ pools f (or satis￿es AIR with respect to f) and we denote by Sf the
class of f-pooling methods.
De￿ne by ￿
￿ the mapping assigning to each t ￿ 0 the unique solution vector
of (3); notice that ￿





is the unique FPM which pools f.
The following comments concerning ￿
￿ will prove useful. Because ￿
￿ is the







i(t) > 0 (technology i is in use). I.e., ￿
￿
i(t) is the level of input
that can be assigned to technology i before its productivity falls below F￿0(t).
Hence, for a given t > 0, the larger ￿
￿
i(t), the more productive technology i is.
We now give some intuition as to why ￿
￿
￿
not only satis￿es AIR but also














Hence, assuming for clarity that ￿
￿













and agent 1 receives her stand-alone level of output. Now, for ￿
￿






shares the marginal output F￿0(t) between agents 2,...,n ac-















j (t) ￿ ￿
￿0
i (t) and agent i receives no less (typically more) than her stand-
alone share of output. And so on. Improvement upon autarky obtains by
integration. In words, when an agent leaves the procedure what is left of her
technology is shared between the remaining agents in proportion to their tech-





is the IMPP mechanism described in the introduction.
Remark 3 Among the rules generated by path stuctures as in Sprumont (1998),
all those (and only those) whose main path is ￿
￿ are f-pooling methods, but their
subpaths may be arbitrary.
Theorem 2 has an interesting converse interpretation. Given a production
function F￿; to any path ￿
￿ corresponds a unique decomposition of F￿ into a
"virtual" production pro￿le, f, such that ￿
￿
￿
is the unique FPM pooling f.
Theorem 3 For any F￿ 2 F and any ￿
￿ 2 P, there exists a unique technology
pro￿le f decomposing F￿ in the sense of (3) such that ￿
￿
￿
pools f. For any







for all 0 ￿ xi ￿ Mi; where ￿
￿
i is de￿ned relative to ￿
￿
i as in expression (1).
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 2. Let F￿ 2 F, ￿
￿ 2 P and f 2 FN
decomposing F￿ in the sense of (3) such that ￿
￿
￿
pools f. For any i 2 N,





The result follows from integrating between 0 and xi (recall fi(0) = 0).
To illustrate Theorem 3, we provide the virtual production pro￿les corre-




gives priority to agent 1. It is equivalent to pooling the
production pro￿le where agent 2￿ s technology is useless compared to that of
agent 1 on [0,M1 + M2].
Example 2. Agents contribute to F￿ in proportion to the ￿i￿ s: fi(t) =
￿iF￿( t
￿i).
Theorems 2 and 3 together establish a striking bijection between the family
of FPMs and the possible distribution of property rights on F￿.
5 Discussion
As made clear in the previous section, the IMPP mechanism is essentially an
FPM and, as such, meets our high standards of incentive compatibility. Yet,
14sharing rules outside the class of FPMs￿ like the ones generated by the path
functions in Sprumont (1998)￿ also meets these standards, along with AIR.
However, the speci￿cation of path functions can potentially be quite com-
plex, requiring the speci￿cation of a subpath  (i;xi) for each agent i at every
level of input xi, whereas the unique FPM satisfying AIR is entirely determined
by the capital pro￿le (f1;:::;fn).




until the departure of agent 1 (subject to the usual relabeling
of agents) and then giving full priority to agent 2, then to agent 3; or the
one sharing the remainder of the technology, G(￿) = F(￿ ￿ x1 ￿ ￿2(￿1(x1)) ￿
￿3(￿1(x1))), according to the (two-agent) Moulin and Shenker serial rule. From
Remark 3, both these simple rules satisfy AIR. Yet, they are not responsive to
capital contributions from the agents; in particular, they do not provide any
incentives for the agents to supply capital, fi , to the partnership. On the other
hand, the IMPP mechanism rewards agents in proportion to the productivity
of the capital contributed and thus encourages the supply of capital.
We contend that the IMPP mechanism is a reasonable compromise between
simplicity and responsiveness to capital contributions, two appealing features for
any practical pro￿t-sharing mechanism in producer cooperatives or professional
partnerships.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Before proving Theorem 2, we present a lemma establishing that under any
FPM, ￿
￿, any positive level of output, xi, can be guaranteed at equilibrium by
some preference u￿
i for agent i. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1 Let ￿ 2 P, i 2 N. For any xi > 0, there exists a preference u￿
i 2 U
such that the following holds:
8u￿i 2 UNni x￿
i = xi;
where x￿ denotes the unique Nash equilibrium of G(￿
￿;u￿
i;u￿i).
Now to the proof of Theorem 2. Let ￿ 2 P such that ￿
￿ pools f. For the
rest of the proof we will write F instead of F￿ as no confusion is possible.




j(xj) for all i;j 2 N; i.e. x is a point
on the graph of ￿
￿. From Lemma 1, there exists a preference pro￿le u 2 UN
such that x is the unique Nash equilibrium of G(￿
￿;u). It follows that ￿
￿ pools








By (5) and the de￿nitions of ￿i and ￿
￿









for all i 2 N and all xi > 0. Let i 2 N and de￿ne Hi(xi) =
R xi
0 F0(￿i(t))dt for
any xi ￿ 0; Hi is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Hence,





i(xi)) ￿ (xi ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿
￿
i(xi))




i(xi)) ￿ (xi ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿
￿
i(xi)) (7)
with equality if and only if xi = ￿i ￿ ￿
￿









0 F0(￿i(t))dt + F0(￿
￿











0 F0(t)d￿i(t) + F0(￿
￿











0 ￿i(t)F00(t)du + F0(￿
￿
i(xi)) ￿ xi

















j(xj) for all i 2 N; and write z = ￿
￿
i(xi) for any i.
Summing up over all i 2 N and using the fact that
P







i(z) = z, we get:
R z






















i(t) = t and integrating by parts again, this yields an equality. There-
fore, equation (6) must be an equality for all i 2 N. The choice of j and xj
16being arbitrary, it follows that ￿i(xi) = ￿
￿
i(xi) for all xi 2 [0;Mi] and for all
i 2 N. That is to say that ￿i ￿ ￿
￿
i for all i 2 N, proving the theorem.
Remark 4 In the de￿nition of an f-pooling method, we could replace the vol-
untary participation requirement with the following weaker one and Theorem 2
would still hold:
"For any pro￿le u 2 UN and any Nash equilibrium x￿ of G(￿;u) the following
holds:
￿i(x￿) ￿ fi(x￿
i) 8i 2 N."
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Notation: We ￿x a production function F 2 F, a path ￿ 2 P and a preference
pro￿le u 2 UN. As no confusion may arise, we shall write ￿ instead of ￿
￿.
We denote by F0
￿ (resp. F0





@￿) is the left-derivative (resp. right-derivative) operator. Also, we
write:
(i) ￿(x1;:::;xn) = (￿1(x1);￿2(x2);:::;￿n(xn)) for any x 2 ￿i2N[0;Mi],
(ii) (t1;t2;:::;ti￿1;ti￿(n￿i)) is the vector of RN
+ with the last (n￿i) coordinates
equal to ti,
(iii) for any (t1;:::;tn) 2 RN
+, ￿(t1;:::;tn) = (￿1(t1);￿2(t2);:::;￿n(tn)) with a
slight abuse of notation.
Let i 2 N and xi > 0. Consider a preference (utility) u￿
i which is quasi-linear
with respect to yi such that its indi⁄erence curves are piecewise linear with a
single kink at (xi;yi) for any yi 2 R. Set the slope of these indi⁄erence curves
to be no greater than F0
￿(￿i(xi)) before xi and no smaller than F0
+(xi) after xi;
where ￿before xi￿(resp. ￿after xi￿ ) stands for ￿at any point of R+￿R with ￿rst
coordinate smaller (resp. greater) than xi￿ .
We show below that the former quantity is the smallest variation in output
that agent i can obtain via ￿ by deviating in￿nitesimally from xi: it corresponds
to the case where she is the ￿rst one served along the path (i.e., the agent with
smallest ￿j(xj)). On the other hand, F0
+(xi) is the largest variation in output
obtainable via ￿ at xi by deviating marginally from xi; it corresponds to the
case where she receives all the output up to F(xi) (￿j(xj) = 0 for all j 6= i).
17Indeed, let x￿i 2 R
Nni
+ ; then, from the de￿nition of ￿, and keeping in mind
that j￿j returns the sum of the coordinates of a vector and ^ is the componentwise




_ (j(￿;x￿i) ^ ￿(￿i(￿) ￿ n)j) and @
+
@￿￿i(￿;x￿i) = F0
+ (j(￿;x￿i) ^ ￿(￿i(￿) ￿ n)j) .
As the ith component of both vectors x and ￿(￿i(xi) ￿ n) is equal to xi, the
concavity of F yields F0
+ (jx ^ ￿(￿i(xi) ￿ n)j) ￿ F0
+(xi). Moreover, the concavity
of F also yields F0
￿ (jx ^ ￿(￿i(xi) ￿ n)j) ￿ F0
￿ (j￿(￿i(xi) ￿ n)j); notice that this
last term equals F0



















Hence, for any x￿i 2 R
Nni
+ , the slope of ￿i(￿;x￿i) at ￿ = xi lies between
F0
￿(￿i(xi)) and F0




+ for any x￿i 2 R
Nni
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